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RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE COMMON
LAW UNITS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH. By Horace Emerson Read.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. xiv, 371.
OF the disparate materials conventionally collected under the somewhat
mysterious label, conflict of laws, no aspect is more practical or indeed of
greater theoretical interest than the enforcement and recognition of foreign
judgments. In a subject such as this, pervaded by traditional doctrines and
concepts, the juristic thread of Ariadne indicating a way amid the maze is
to be found in the critical analysis and reformulation of legal theory by refer-
ence to the manifold experience provided by history, past and present. What
needs more emphasis is that the received legal doctrines need periodic re-
examination and revision, to determine whether they continue to be true
and useful in substance as well as in form.
On this account, the appearance of monographic methods of inquiry, as
excellently exemplified by this, the second of the Harvard Studies in the
Coflict of Laws, is an encouraging development. Especially in this quarter,
which has been too much ruled by dogmatics. In this volume, the author
has covered exhaustively the authoritative materials - the judicial decisions
and statutes-of the United Kingdom and the British Dominions as a basis
for the exposition of what he terms the "Anglo-Dominion" law concerning
foreign judgments. In scope, this approach of itself constitutes a noteworthy
advance upon the customary British mode of treating problems of the conflict
of laws, by a mere exposition of legal products. With this exception, however,
the treatment is in the British manner; it sets forth the status of the present
doctrine, primarily through analysis of the judicial precedents supplemented
by accounts of the pertinent statutory provisions and on certain points by
reference to the prior historical development of ideas. No effort is made,
for want of satisfactory data, to determine the degree to which "the present
precepts meet the present requirements of society." These delimitations ob-
viously address the work primarily to the attention of the British legal world,
but the present status of Anglo-Dominion doctrine concerning foreign judg-
ments will scarcely be of less interest in this country. Moreover, it is a useful
contribution to the consideration of an important branch of law which has
hitherto received inadequate attention.
The work is divided into three books: (1) the legal nature of foreign
judgments, (2) the principles applicable in delimiting the jurisdiction of
foreign courts, (3) the procedures available for the enforcement of foreign
judgments. In dealing with the various topics under each of the foregoing
heads, there will be found detailed discussion not only of the relevant English
cases but in addition of the wealth of material available in the Dominion juris-
prudence. Within this range, the treatment is comprehensive, constructively
critical and on certain topics, such, for example, as the jurisdiction in matri-
monial actions, provides an illuminating summary of current Anglo-Dominion
doctrine which is not elsewhere to be duplicated.
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It is scarcely warranted to add to this review reference to various minutiae
of primary concern to specialists in the subject matter. The work does how-
ever suggest certain issues of broader interest which may be briefly noted.
The first such issue is involved in Chapter I, which is denominated "Judg-
ments foreign within the British Commonwealth," but which on inspection
appears to be distinctively concerned with the application of the notion of
the "law district" within the British Empire. As the author states, the notion
stems from Dicey's definition,' in which the political and legal denotations
of the term "country" as employed in his treatise are distinguished, the legal
denotation thereof being alternatively designated "law district" and defined
as "the whole of a territory subject to one system of law." This definition,.
which we may suspect was primarily framed in view of unitary systems of
law, does not explicitly exclude the possibility that law districts may overlap
in space, if not in subject matter. It will also be recalled that this notion has
been adopted in less precise language as part of the Restatcnscnt of Conflicts.2
As so adopted, however, the concept contains the qualification, accepted by
Professor Read, that law districts are necessarily exclusive of each other in
point of territory. For this reason, we are instructed in the Restatentent that
the United States is not a territorial unit or "state" in the legal sense. Ob-
viously, the application of such a concept to the jurisdictional systems in the
British Empire is of intriguing theoretical interest, if only on account of its
seeming inappropriateness to federal structures.
This circumstance may perhaps explain why, in a monograph on the recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the initial fifty pages are devoted
to a consideration of the "law districts" in the British Empire, a point of
departure which would certainly seem somewhat bizarre if the application of
the notion to Canadian or Australian conditions were relatively self-explana-
tory. However this may be, the author's conclusions constitute a demonstra-
tion, perhaps unwitting, that the principle of exclusive territorial law districts
or legal units which has been adopted in the Restatcment of the La,: of
Conflict of Laws in unsatisfactory. The situation in Canada and in Australia
as summarized on pages 27 and 50-51 involves various overlappings of juris-
diction in space, indicating that a given territorial area may at one time form
a part of more than one law district. Despite the Restatcnsent, similar situa-
tions exist in the judicial structure of the United States. This of course by
no means disproves the value of the concept of the "law district" as a term
of art, but it does suggest that the term needs to be redefined to fit the facts
and to suit the purposes for which it may be employed.
This conclusion is measurably strengthened by an even more significant
difficulty. As the author states on pages 3-4, the purpose of this very inter-
esting inquiry as to the law districts in the British Empire is to enxplain the
fact that there exist within the British Commonwealth a number of such
districts "the judgments of whose courts are legally foreign intcr se," and
thereby to determine the criteria of "foreignness." Examination of the argu-
ment discloses, however, a somewhat singular situation: the criterion of a
1. Diczv, CoNmucr oF LAws (5th ed. 1932) 53.
2. RFSTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAws (1934) § 2.
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foreign judgment is that it is a judgment of a court of a foreign law district
(p. 6), but the criterion (or criteria) of a foreign law district seems to be
a variable. Thus, on page 6 the criterion suggested is that the foreign law
district has a single body of law distinct from that of the territory of the
forum. On page 7 the question is made to depend upon the historical limita-
tion of the territory for purposes of law administration. On page 18 the
area within a law district is defined by the territory within which the process
of the court runs and within which its judgments are executory. This principle
is also apparently adopted on pages 22, 33, 36 and 37 to determine the
existence of other particular law districts. On the other hand, on pages
.38-39 the fact that the Australian Service and Execution of Process Act,
1901-1934, extends the process of the state courts throughout the Common-
wealth of Australia is not deemed to require a corresponding limitation of
the competence of these courts. The author may therefore be regarded as
being in the position of defining the "foreign judgment" concept by a "law
district" concept which does not seem to be consistently defined. The nearest
approach to a solution of the anomaly thus presented found by the reviewer
is the statement on page 36 to the effect:
"As a state court exercising invested federal jurisdiction does
not have competence beyond the limits of the state territory, on
principle the body of law applied by it is state law."
Which is to say, if we infer correctly, that the essential criterion of a law~
district is the territorial competence of its courts.
Even with this simplification, we are not free from difficulty. For, on the
author's showing, the factors determining the territorial competence of courts
are by no means clearly defined. We can scarcely accept the location of the
subject matter litigated at the time when the cause of action arose or even
at the time of litigation in the forum, for in transitory actions this may be
in some foreign land. Nor, as has been indicated, is the area within which
the process of the court runs necessarily decisive. Nor, as is indicated by
the discussion on pages 34 and following, is the territory covered by the
applicable law indicative, e.g., in the case of transitory actions or situations
where state courts are invested with "federal jurisdiction." This leaves us
with the barren test suggested on page 7, namely, the historical delimitation
of areas for purposes of law administration. One difficulty with accepting
this as a test is that unnecessarily small units, such as counties, cities, etc.,
may not unreasonably be regarded as law districts. Its real difficulty, however,
is that it does not inform us what a law district is, even though in fact we
may well be able to agree upon the existence at given times and places of
certain law districts.
This negative conclusion, which seems to the reviewer of some importance,
leads to a second issue suggested by reading of this monograph. Although
we should not assume that there is a necessary relation between the doctrines
of vested rights and territoriality, the concept of the "law district" or legal
unit of territory is an essential element in the more recent versions of the
vested rights theory, since in these versions the determination of conflicts
of laws is regarded as a question of territorial jurisdiction. In Dicey's version,
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questions of judicial jurisdiction, including those relating to foreign judg-
ments, are treated apart from the problems of legislative jurisdiction or choice
of law; indeed, in his version the "law district" concept seems to have sig-
nificance only for purposes of legislative jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
Beale's version, which is also incorporated in the Restatecnwet, a tacit assimi-
lation of judicial and legislative jurisdiction seems to have occurred. Un-
fortunately, Professor Read appears to have followed this latter and less
satisfactory point of view. To cite a characteristic illustration: on page 4,
the doctrine of the territoriality of lav in Anglo-Dominion jurisprudence is
predicated upon two decisions, the one relating to the domestic English divorce
jurisdiction and the other concerning the territoriality of English and Indian
law applicable in Zanzibar. Without raising question as to whether these
decisions support a broad principle of territoriality, which to an outlander
appears somewhat dubious, it will be noted that the citation supposes a neces-
sary confusion of legislative and judicial jurisdiction.
This, it occurs to the reviewer, is the rudimentary source of difficulty in
the author's treatment of the "law district" problem in relation to the British
Commonwealth. It should not take much argument to be convinced that,
except in the subject matter covered by local actions where there is consider-
able parallelism between the applicable standards of legislative and judicial
jurisdiction, there is little more than a nominal relationship between the two
sets of standards. In the more important sphere of transitory actions, either
the territory of the competent court and the formal territory of the proper
law are different, as in so-called conflict of laws cases, or if they correspond
as in situations where for one reason or another the lex fori is applied, the
principle involved is not as a rule the same as that by which the jurisdiction
of the court is to be justified. Consequently, it does not seem possible to
work out a coherent theory of the "law district," faithfully reflecting existent
practices, on the assumption that the two types of jurisdiction are governed
by identical or even substantially similar criteria.
In the third place and finally, a few words as to the extremely interesting
discussion, particularly in Chapters II, III and VII, of the basic theory for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In effect, if with the
author we restrict ourselves to traditionally authenticated conceptions, there
is a choice among the following points of view:
(1) The earliest cases in the seventeenth century give some support to the
principle that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is con-
formable to the law of nations.
(2) Under the doctrine of comity, which was first definitely formulated
by Ulric Huber, a Frisian jurist, towards the end of the seventeenth century
and is still not without influence, but which appears to have been especially
significant in Anglo-American jurisdictions during the first half of the nine-
teenth century, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is not
obligatory under international law but is effected by the mutual concessions
of states in the interests of international intercourse.
(3) Under the vested rights doctrine, which dispossessed the comity doc-
trine during the nineteenth century and still is generally accepted in Anglo-
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American quarters, the effectiveness of judgments in foreign jurisdictions is
explained on the ground that they create vested rights.
Irrespective of which of the above points of view be chosen and still ac-
cepting the traditional conceptions as the basis of theory, a foreign judgment
may be recognized or enforced either (a) as a judgment, essentially homo-
geneous with a corresponding domestic judgment, or (b) as constituting a
debt or implied contract or (c) as a source of legal obligation which does not
require further differentiation. We repeat that any of these qualifications of
a foreign judgment logically may be crossed with any of the foregoing points
of view.
In indicating his solution, the author adopts what Bower has described
as the "extremely jejune formula" of Blackburn, J., in Schibsby v. Westen-
holz that
"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction over the de-
fendant imposes a duty or obligation on the defendant to pay the sum
for which judgment is given, which the courts in this country are
bound to enforce." 3
to support the vested rights doctrine as the basis for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This, we presume, is the accepted view
in the British legal world today.
Without attempting to probe to the roots of this very interesting' and
influential conception, we may venture a few cursory observations. The first
is that, if the formula quoted above may be interpreted in the light of the
two prior opinions of Parke, B., in Russell v. Smyth4 and Williams v. Joncs5
upon which it is predicated, the argument is that an executory foreign judg-
ment is a judgment and that therefore, upon rendition of such a judgment
as upon a domestic judgment, a legal obligation arises which will support
an action. In the second place, it may be remarked that the above-quoted
formula is specifically relevant to executory foreign judgments, not to cases
in which a foreign judgment is relied upon as a defense. In the latter type
of case, it is entirely congruous with Baron Parke's theory to assimilate
foreign' and domestic judgments in the application of the principles of res
judicata. On this account, we may question the author's suggestion on page
111 that the rule as to the conclusiveness of foreign judgments which was
evolved in the nineteenth century should be regarded, not as an extension
of the principles of res judicata to foreign judgments but rather as an exem-
plification of the vested rights doctrine. Undoubtedly, in Baron Parke's theory
the so-called "legal obligation" theory is associated with the vested rights
doctrine. This, however, appears incidental; the fundamental hypothesis is
that foreign judgments are judgments. Accordingly, a foreign judgment,
when executory, like a domestic judgment, may form a basis of action;
when relied upon as a defense, again like an analogous domestic judgment,
it is to be given effect conformably to the principles of res judicata.
3. L. R. 6 Q. B. 155, 159 (1870).
4. 9 M. & W. 810, 819, 152 Eng. Rep. 343, 347 (Ex. 1842).
5. 13 M. & W. 628, 633, 153 Eng. Rep. 262, 263 (Ex. 1845).
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Incidentally, it may be remarked that the so-called "legal obligation" theory
may readily be dissociated from the vested rights doctrine; it merely needs
to be assumed that the legal obligation arising upon a foreign judgment is
created, not by the judgment, but by the lex fori. On this ground, it would
seem that the author's animadversions upon Piggott's objection to the "doc-
trine of legal obligation," namely, that a legal obligation is enforceable only
by the state in which it has been called into being, miss fire. We are inclined
to agree with the author's point that the legal obligation arising upon a
foreign judgment is not an absolute one, but this does not answer the argu-
ment, in the absence of a showing that other types of obligations are exempt
from the limitation suggested by Piggott.
In conclusion, this review is scarcely a proper forum in which to canvass
at large the vested rights doctrine, which the author appears to advocate
with a degree of conviction. But in view of this circumstance and the past
and present place occupied by the doctrine in Anglo-American legal theory,
a few observations may be made. In the first place, from an historical point
of view, there is something to be said for the doctrine. In the field of foreign
judgments, it influenced the English courts to escape the aberrations intro-
duced into the law by Lord Mansfield with respect to the prima facie effect
of foreign judgments, and, by emphasizing their character as a source of
private liability, it laid the basis for a more liberal practice in the recognition
and enforcement of such judgments than was contemporaneously evolved in
civil law jurisdictions.
This service, however, is scarcely a certificate of validity. But if current
legal theory 'should reflect the advance of legal science, the vested rights
doctrine appears far from adequate. From the viewpoint of modem legal
analysis, its chief defect is that it begs the question; it does not inform us
how, why or under what limitations foreign claims are to be recognized
and enforced as vested rights. Under the view accepted by the author, the
question is sought to be answered by the principle of territoriality. But, as
has been suggested above, the author's application of the 'qaw district" con-
cept, a concept which is, as it were, the touchstone of the principle of terri-
toriality, to conditions within the British Commonwealth fails to indicate a
definite content. It is a real contribution to have directed attention to this
aspect of the problem in fairly specific terms, since it puts us on the way to
the somewhat startling discovery that the principle of territoriality as cus-
tomarily envisaged, is fundamentally incompatible with the vested rights
doctrine with which it is customarily associated. The truth is that the vested
rights doctrine is a somewhat diffused or diluted version of the internationalist
position; it supposes the existence of some supra-national body of law by
virtue of which, not the laws of each state, but rights and other legal rela-
tions created by such laws, are effective in other states. But this conception,
which may be traced back to Savigny, only serves to obscure the issue; if
foreign rights are to be regarded as effective in the forum, why not the laws
which create such rights? And the doctrine rests upon a natural law theory
about law, which is no longer convincing.
All this intimates that the conventional theories about conflicts of laws
deserve fundamental reconsideration. Neither the vested rights analysis nor
1940] 1139
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the more recent strictly positivistic alternatives seem adequate to represent
either existing law or the law which probably ought to be. Among other
things, both strains of thought are too much preoccupied with the claims of
sovereign power. And yet we venture to suggest that though neither the
internationalist approach (of which the vested rights doctrine is a species)
nor that of positivism is adequate, both reflect considerations which the future
theory of the subject must take into account. How such a reconciliation is to
be accomplished we do not here profess to suggest, but we are grateful to




BRITISH WVAGES BOARDS. A Study in Industrial Democracy. By Dorothy
Sells. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1939. Pp. xv, 389. $3.00.
BRITISH minimum wage legislation and administration have as many general
points of similarity to the Fair Labor Standards Act' and its administration
as they have specific points of detailed difference. Both involve a bipartite
system whereby administrative action leading to the setting of minimum
wages is divided between a government officer-the Minister of Labour in
Great Britain, and the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division in the
United States-and groups of representatives of the wage-payer, the wage-
earner and the public-called Trade Boards in Great Britain, and Industry
Committees in the United States. Again, in general outlines, the division of
functions between these two groups, the representative body and the govern-
ment officer, is similar for both systems. In each, the government officer has
the duty of setting the machinery which leads to a wage order in motion
through selection of the industry which is to be affected and through choice
of the committee or board members-vital functions which, although pre-
liminary, may ultimately determine not only the wage itself but the success
or failure of its operation. In each national system, the task of deciding upon
a minimum wage recommendation is wholly the board's or the committee's.
And, finally, in each case, the recommendation is subject to the approval or
rejection (but not the modification) of the Administrator or the Minister of
Labour.
Miss Sells describes the British utilization of the trade boards as an ex-
periment in industrial democracy in that those who are regulated themselves
play an official and vital part in determining the regulation; the Wage and
Hour Division, in its First Annual Report,2 has similarly extolled the indus-
try committee system as exemplifying the "democratic process" which gives
tProfessor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. Pub. L. No. 718, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) ; 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C.
§201 (Supp. 1938).
2. (Mimeographed ed. 1939) 135-138.
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official status to "practical" men in the administrative system. But in the
actual division of functions between the two groups which together are re-
sponsible for the issuance of the ultimate wage order, Great Britain and the
United States have differed to a considerable extent. Under the British sys-
tern, the Trade Board is paramount and a semi-permanent official body. The
Minister must, indeed, receive objections to and scrutinize the recommenda-
tion and, within 14 days, approve or reject. The process seems to be more or
less a cursory one; no public hearings, no taking of testimony, no formalities
occur after the recommendation. If the recommendation is approved and is
issued in the form of a wage order, the Trade Board's task is nut completed;
rather it remains as guardian of the order, supervising its enforcement, study-
ing its effects, advising on its scope, meeting regularly and maintaining a per-
manent sub-committee. Under the FLSA, there is, on the other hand, greater
emphasis upon the role of the Administrator. The Industry Committee's rec-
ommendation cannot be issued as a wage order until the Administrator has
held a public hearing to assure himself that the recommendation is supported
by evidence and has been reached in accordance with law. The public hear-
ing involves a complete reexamination of the issues; it is essentially judicial
in character, involving swearing of witnesses, cross-examination and, there-
after, oral arguments. The transcript of the hearing may-and it has done
so-cover 6,000 pages of transcript and almost a year may elapse between
the recommendation and the order. And, although at least two committees
have recommended that they be reconvened after a year that they might study
the effects of their recommendation. theirs is rather a hit and run function:
after the recommendation, their duties are ended and problems of enforce-
ment, interpretation and administration are wholly in the hands of the Wage
and Hour Division. In short, there obtains under the American system a ten-
dency toward what Miss Sells terms "administrative fiat" rather than com-
plete industrial self-regulation and democracy.
But it is submitted that the problem is not quite so simple as that. A labor
spokesman has written that "the least successful" of the phases of American
wage-hour administration has
"proved to be the operating record of industry committees. The
progress in the work of these committees has been slow and halting.
There has been a tendency to arrive at wage recommendations
blind-folded by drawing lots rather than careful weighing of all
available facts." 3
Similar suspicion of the industry committees' complete objectivity has been
voiced in the course of hearings by employers opposed to the recommenda-
tions; they have charged that the committees have "made up their mind in
advance," have given the factual and economic data little consideration,4 and
have proceeded in a "disorderly" and confused manner so that members do
not even know what the vote is, or precisely upon what they are voting. One
must, of course, discount some of these charges emanating as they do, at
3. Shiskdn, Wage-Hour Adminfiration From Labor's Viewpoint (1939) 29 Aix.
LAB. LzGis. REv. 63-64.
4. See the statement of a committee member who dissented from the majority rec-
ommendation, (1939) 2 WAGE & HOUR REP. 522-523.
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least in part, from labor which has been inclined to be impatient with the
slowness of the process, and from those employers who are in any event op-
posed to the recommendations. But the conviction remains that the commit-
tees do not proceed with entire objectivity or detached intensity, or that they
do their homework and study the immense volume of technical data pre-
sented them. On at least one occasion, Division staff members had tactfully
to restrain the committee from voting upon a 40 cent minimum-the highest
possible-a few hours after the committee had convened.
But can one realistically expect the situation to be different? These char-
acteristics-whether faults or not-seem to inhere in the statutory scheme
which requires that this type of law-making be performed not only by ama-
teurs in legislation but by "representatives." First, the committee members
are part-time legislators, men absorbed in their own affairs, usually anxious
to get home and back to work, regarding the wage-order recommendation as
a temporary interruption in the pursuit of their primary interests-something
in the nature of jury duty. Second, and even more fundamental, is the fact
that the committee members are not, under the statute, chosen for their ob-
jectivity. Their selection is predicated upon interest representation: there
must be an equal number of representatives of employers, employees and the
public. In addition, not only must various branches of each industry be rep-
resented, but due regard is required to be given to geographical considera-
tions. When a member is chosen because he is a Southern employer, or a
Northern CIO representative, it is entirely expectable that he should func-
tion primarily as an advocate for that group.
Perhaps some of the dissatisfaction with the industry committees rests in
the failure to realize this. Unfortunately, the FLSA casts the process into
formal moulds: the committee must "investigate" and thereafter the pattern
is judicial, with judicial Administrator's hearings and judicial review by the
circuit courts of appeals. On the other hand, Miss Sells' book abundantly
demonstrates that under the British system, the Trade Board process is clearly
recognized as a collective bargaining process and little more. Indeed, Miss
Sells suggests that, at least by American standards, a major defect of the
Trade Board system is its failure to utilize and study factual and economic
data-the sort of material fed to industry committees beyond their capacity
to digest. Miss Sells approves of the Trade Board method of minimum wage
legislation almost without qualification.
Basically, the issue is whether administrative legislation should be vested
in the hands of interest representatives at all, or whether responsible impar-
tial governmental officers should deal with the problems and utilize the "prac-
tical" men as advisors only. To the latter part of this question, as already
indicated, Miss Sells' answer is emphatically negative. But although her
book is a useful and comprehensive study of the Trade Board system, one
comes to its end without knowing just why the system works so well. Sus-
picion of legislation by interest groups is not dispelled by her study. She
indicates some tendency to ascribe the Trade Board success to British cricket
or its democratic spirit or its sense of fair play. But one must thirst for
more. Is the success of the British process, and the sweetness and light which
accompany it (except for a serious crisis early in the 1920's) due to the frank
recognition that this type of administrative legislation is nothing but col-
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lective-bargaining and horse-trading? Are the rough spots which mark Amer-
ican industry committee procedure due to the failure of the FLSA, the regu-
lators and the regulatees to realize that scholastic or judicial, or both, char-
acteristics cannot and should not be imposed upon the system? Should the
American committees be allowed fuller autonomy and greater power not only
over the ultimate order but over the supervision of its administration? Is
the British success due to the fact that the Trade Boards are given greater
responsibility which diminishes the hit and run tendencies of American indus-
try committees?
Since, despite the fact that upon tie cover of liss Sells' book is posed the
question "What light does the British experience throw upon wage and hour
legislation and administration in the United States?," it is not and does not
purport to be a comparative study, these questions raise themselves upon a
reading of the book, but they are not answered. Nor, although it is a book
without which the library of a student either of minimum wage legislation
or administrative problems would be incomplete, does it include the material
from which the reader can supply his own answers. One cannot avoid Wish-
ing that Miss Sells had devoted more space to the details of the internal de-
liberations and mental attitudes of the Trade Boards and to their actual
mechanics; one must also hope that her intimate knowledge of the British
system will result in a sequel in which the differences between it and the
American system will be isolated and evaluated, and their consequences dis-
cussed. As a description of the British system, Miss Sells' book is doubtless
invaluable and complete in itself. But if the reader is familiar With the Amer-
ican process, provocative questions arise and omissions of details which might
otherwise provide the answer, become apparent. RicH~im S. SALNT fz
WVashington, D. C.
HANDBOOK OF AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Henrv Rottschaefer.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1939. Pp. 985. $5.00.
THIs book is primarily a survey of leading decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution of the United States, and only
incidentally is attention given to decisions of lower federal courts and state
courts of final appeal.
Although the author's preface was written in January, 1939, subsequent
decisions of the Court have already rendered the volume more or less serious-
ly out of date on topics of importance; for example, with regard to the recip-
rocal immunity from taxation of the Federal Government and the states and
the taxation of judicial salaries;1 with regard to judicial review of the
validity of constitutional amendments and the general significance for judi-
Member of New York Bar; Special Attorney, Department of Justice.
1. Cf. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939); Woodrough Y. O'Malley, 307
U. S. 277 (1939).
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cial review of the "political questions" concept;' as to the potency of the
judicial ban on the delegation of legislative power ;3 as to the viability of the
ban on Congressional prohibitions of commerce among the states ;4 as to
local license taxes on interstate sales.5 On the other hand, Professor Rott-
schaefer appears to have sensed in the offing the Court's recent revision of
its doctrines with respect to state succession taxes.6
At times, Professor Rottschaefer becomes quite realistic. He admits that
judicial interpretations of the Constitution are inexplicable on the assump-
tion "that the Constitutional language has at all times constituted the dominant
factors in the process" ;7 also that "principles of interpretation guide courts,
but do not dictate solutions" ;8 likewise that the doctrine of stare decisis is a
doubtful reliance in this field, being "sometimes applied and sometimes
ignored." 9 At other times, however, he assumes the heavy, quasi-theological
role of commentator and summator of the law. On an early page he writes
thus:
"There exists an incomplete, but nevertheless a considerable, de-
gree of uniformity and continuity in the judicial process of constru-
ing written constitutions. Its existence to any degree makes possible
a measure of doctrinal integration in this field of law. It is only
because some degree of such uniformity and continuity exists that
the development of our constitutional law has been an orderly rather
than a chaotic process, and that it is possible to view it as a system
of law rather than a mere congeries of isolated decisions."' 0
Operating on the basis of these assumptions, whose very partial validity
his own statement of them sufficiently exposes, he proceeds to treat with equal
deference all cases which are as yet un-overruled and to fashion their diver-
gent doctrines, when they bear on the same topic, into a rounded whole. While
such exegetical efforts apparently answer a professional need, comparable
to that served by the old Bible Concordance, they appear somewhat naive
when viewed in the light of history, and the more so as their verbal product
is frequently little better than jargon.
Thus even Professor Rottschaefer chants the time honored clich6 "that
a court will invalidate a legislative act only if its repugnance to constitutional
requirements is clear,"" without pausing to explain what this means in terms
of judicial practice, if indeed it means anything. Likewise he affirms that
courts will not pass on constitutional issues "in a collusive suit nor in a
friendly proceeding in which it clearly appears that there is no bona fide and
actual assertion of adverse legal claims," and in the very next sentence he
ratifies the rule under which the Court took jurisdiction in the Pollock case. 12
In the face of the Social Security Tax cases, he remarks that while there is
in a "limited sense a federal police power," "it is not . . . an independent
2. Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (1939).
3. United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533 (1939).
4. Cf. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1938).
5. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 8 U. S. L. WEEK 206 (U. S. 1940).
6. Currey v. McCandless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
7. P. 2. 8. P. 19.
9. Pp. 42-43. 10. P. 4.
11. P. 18. 12. P. 26.
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power, but rather denotes a power incidentally to promote such results so
far as they lie within the range of its delegated powers,"': which means-
well, just what does it mean? These cases are treated as leaving the doctrines
of the Butler case unaffected, and a sort of algebraic summation of their hold-
ings is attempted in the following passage.
"The net result of the Butler and Social Security Tax Cases
seems to be that the federal taxing and spending powers may be
used to induce private persons and states to cooperate with the na-
tional government to realize any objectives for which federal pow-
ers, including the taxing power, may be exercised, but that the pre-
servation of the states as independent units in the constitutional
system of the United States is a limiting factor in the definition of
those objectives."'14
Rottschaefer immediately adds, however,
"This principle is admittedly vague, but the obscurities of the de-
cisions from wlich it is derived do not permit its formulation in
more precise and specific terms."' 5
His endeavor to save Hanziner v. Dagenhart from the onrush of more recent
doctrine is similarly unilluminating.10
Indeed, this quest for "doctrinal integration" at times results in his being
seriously misleading, e.g., concepts which have governed the Court's applica-
tion of the "obligation of contracts" clause to public contracts are treated as
if they applied when private contracts are involved, and vice versa.'7 Actu-
ally this is true only in the case of public contracts. Quite consistently, the
definition which he gives of "the obligation of the contract"18 makes no sense
whatsoever when applied to public contracts. Similarly, he follows the state-
ment that certain powers of the Federal Government "may be based on the
fact that the Constitution has made the United States a sovereign and in-
dependent nation vested with the entire control of the international relations
of its people," with the statement that "the national government possesses no
inherent powers."' 9 Yet if a power which is attributed to the National Gov-
ernment on the score solely of its belonging to the American nation is not
an "inherent power," what is it?
Unquestionably, what one misses most in these pages is the time perspective.
It is true that occasional reference is made to pertinent historical facts, but
little use is made of such data to sketch a background against which the pres-
ent state of the law might be instructively projected. And only the most
casual attention is given to the etiology and evolution of doctrines and dow-
trinal trends. The discussion is conducted, in the main. on a flat plane of con-
temporaneity. This characteristic of the work seems likely to impose serious
limitations on its usefulness. In view of the shaky state of stare decisis in
this field, practitioners would often find it worth while to examine the non-
jural factors which have in the past determined the law's development. And
for the teachers and students for whom the book is primarily designed it is
13. P. 88. 14. P. 181.
15. Ibid. 16. Pp. 242-245.
17. P. 563. 18. P. 565.
19. P. 24.
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an even more serious defect which cuts the subject off from its varied and
rich cultural aspects.
The development of private law by judicial decision is usually a step by
step affair, and knowledge of the precedents is of foremost importance, since
it is from the verbal manipulation of proximate decisions that the new law
will ordinarily derive most of their substance as well as form. In consti-
tutional law, on the other hand, it has happened, repeatedly, that the general
social and political outlook of the Court was the factor of preponderant im-
portance in determining the course of decision. Consequently, to under-
stand the subject, it is not enough to treat the various branches of it as if
they were water tight compartments; or to be content with mere verbal har-
monizations of divergent holdings, especially when the need for harmoniza-
tion arises from newer trends.
The final test of Professor Rottschaefer's two dimensional method is sup-
plied by his attitude toward the recent and still proceeding revolution in our
constitutional law. This is dealt with piecemeal, since it becomes pertinent
to treat its results in connection with specific topics. At no point is adequate
indication given that there may be certain generating ideas back of and coin-
mon to all of the various specific changes. Indeed, one is left with the im-
pression of a rather reluctant retirement before the new point of view, and
of an effort to salvage as many of the old doctrines and dogmatisms as pos-
sible from its advance. The fact of the matter is that Constitutional Law
can not be satisfactorily dealt with exclusively by the procedures which are
suitable to private law, and for the reason that much of it is primarily con-
stitutional history and politics.
EDWARD S. CORWIN "
Princeton, New Jersey.
SOvIET HOUSING LAw. By John N. Hazard. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1939. Pp. 178. $2.50.
IN 1872 Engels had written, "In order to make an end of this housing
shortage there is only one means: to abolish altogether the exploitation and
oppression of the working class by the ruling class."' There was a mal-
distribution of available shelter to be remedied by expropriation and state
ownership.2 Mr. Hazard has now presented to the public a very competently
prepared monograph on the methods and means adopted by Soviet Russia
in its attempt to effect this redistribution.
Briefly and tersely presented are the chaotic days following the Revolu-
tion, the expropriation of large dwellings, the transitional reliance in the '20s
and '30s on private enterprise in the form of cooperatives, and the final
tProfessor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University.
1. ENGELS, THE HOUSING QUESTION (2d German ed. 1887) 21.
2. "But one thing is certain: there are already in existence sufficient buildings for
dwellings in the big towns to remedy immediately any real 'housing shortage', given
rational utilization of them." Id. at 36.
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maturing of Soviet housing policy in 1937 at which time practically all
housing schemes came under the direct control of local governments or state
enterprises.
Having laid the historical background, the author adopts a strictly private
law viewpoint in considering the housing policy of the Soviet, the rights
acquired by an individual and the means of acquiring them are continuously
contrasted with the common law of landlord and tenant. The right to occupy
does not depend on contract, but on status; dwelling space is not marketed,
but allocated; rents are not bargained for, but determined by maximum and
minimum standards; the lease continues not as an instrument creating rights,
but as the medium for particularizing governmental policy. The statutes are
the basis of emphasis and two of the most important are translated in the
Appendix. Court decisions are cited and their facts detailed largely in an
attempt to lend local color to the legal principles. The technique of calcu-
lating rents is amply set out, though the administrative process with reference
to them is left unexplored. The most interesting chapter of the volume is
that pertaining to the work of the "comradely courts" of municipalized dwell-
ings composed of laymen elected by the tenants for purposes of enforcing
discipline and settling petty disputes.
As a comparative study of the detailed concepts of two societies functioning
under antithetical views of property, the work is interesting. As a study of
the devices adopted for remedying the housing ills common to all nations,
it is disappointing. This is so because the "law" as understood by Mr. Hazard
is simply a group of principles applying to an individual in securing and
retaining shelter. The obligation and the function of the state in improving
housing conditions seems beyond the scope of the book. No adequate picture
is presented of the background against which Mr. Hazard's legal principles
function. While the reader is informed that rent is calculated on the average
basis of nine square meters per persona exclusive of kitchen and bath, there
is nowhere an indication of the standard living unit; rent is also less if the
room is completely dark, damp or semi-basement, but no attention is given
to the function of public health officers in closing substandard dwellings. The
extent and character of new Soviet construction is not mentioned and the
administrative methods of rationing it are but vaguely intimated.
There appears to be considerable activity in the field of city planning and
demolition, but the means of carrying it out are not referred to. A com-
parative treatment of English and American procedures would seem appro-
priate, but the opportunity is permitted to pass ungrasped. While one is left
with the impression that there are numerous administrative bodies dealing with
housing questions, their nature, duties and powers are left unknown.
While the preface suggests the interest in public housing in the United
States as a cause for undertaking this study, the execution contributes but
little to the further understanding of problems shortly to be faced by public
housing authorities in this country. It would seem that greater attention
to the legal standards of fitness, and to problems of administration would
have materially enhanced its merit. What the author has done, has been done
3. But in 'Moscow in 1936 only 4.5 square meters per person were available though
there has been general improvement since then. P. 16.
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extremely well; what he has contributed to the fuller understanding of public
housing problems in this country is questionable.
WILLIAM J. BARRONf
Charlottesville, Virginia.
THE TAXATION OF SIIALL INCO-MES. By Paul J. Strayer. New York: The
Ronald Press, 1939. Pp. Ix, 210. $3.00.
ALTHOUGH for some years an increasing public interest has been shown
in proposals to extend income taxation downward to smaller incomes through
lowering personal exemptions and credits for dependents, there has been, as
the author of this book points out, little comprehensive analysis of the prob-
lems and implications of such proposals. The book is presented with the pur-
pose of filling this gap in American financial literature.
Dr. Strayer's analysis of the subject is built around four criteria of tax
policy: revenue productiveness and stability, equitable distribution of the tax
burden, tax consciousness and administrative feasibility.
The estimates presented of the amount of revenue which might be derived
from lowering exemptions, although not new' are significant. The antici-
pated volume of revenue is substantial, but is disappointingly small when
compared with the expectations reflected in the popular press. Furthermore,
a large part of the increase would be paid by persons already subject to in-
come taxation.
Figures on the distribution of tax burdens in the United States2 are cited
to show that the distribution is regressive in the lower ranges of income. The
substitution of income taxation on small incomes for some of the more re-
gressive taxes now imposed on them would operate to reduce regressiveness
or perhaps even to make the tax system progressive in these income ranges.
Of great importance also is the possibility of adjusting the income tax to va-
riations in the family responsibilities of different persons in the same income
classes. No other tax can be adjusted as well to differences in responsibilities
and most taxes cannot be so adjusted at all. The author's conclusion is that
from the viewpoint of the equitable distribution of the tax burden, the use
of income taxes on low incomes is highly desirable, although it should be ac-
companied by the relief of the lowest income classes from all or part of other
forms of taxation.
Much of the sentiment for imposing the income tax on small incomes has
arisen from the belief that the resulting increase in tax consciousness would
produce greater interest in efficient and economical government. The author
finds that in the past a keen consciousness of taxes often has had harmful
rather than helpful effects. He seriously questions the ready assumption
that lowering personal income tax exemptions would substantially improve
the attitude toward government of recipients of small incomes and maintains
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
1. They are taken from or based on TWENTIETH 'CENTURY FUND, FACING TuE
TAX PROBLEM (1937) and STUDIES IN CURRENT TAX PROBLEMS (1937).
2. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM (1937).
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that the actual result is unpredictable. Furthermore, the number of new per-
sons who would be made tax conscious by lowering personal exemptions is
limited since even with exemptions as low as the British, only a small minor-
ity of the voters would be subject to the income tax.
Serious administrative difficulties are anticipated by the author if income
taxes are imposed on small incomes. The number of persons involved, the
small size of tax payment by each and the great difficulty in checking the
amounts of income for great numbers of such persons increase as the exemp-
tion is reduced. Collection at source is not possible for large numbers of the
population and it has substantial disadvantages with respect to many others.
Even information at source is not available for a large proportion of the per-
sons who would be made liable to tax by reduction in exemptions.
After an interesting description of the taxation of small incomes in Great
Britain, Australia and Germany, the author presents his final conclusions.
These are discouraging for the use of markedly lower exemptions although
he appears to favor gradual lowering as an experiment to determine whether
still lower exemptions might be feasible.
Some shortcomings were observed in the book, but they are for the most
part minor. The quantitative data are taken almost entirely from previously
published sources. It is not shown how present exemption levels compare
with the costs of maintaining various standards of living as estimated by gov-
ernmental and private agencies. Computations of the proportion of the popu-
lation subject to income tax appear to have included taxpayers only, omitting
consideration of spouses and other members of the family. The statements
of various administrative agencies, federal, state and foreign, regarding effect-
iveness of administration have apparently been accepted with little or no in-
dependent check on their adequacy.
In its presentation of the major facts, experience and arguments relating to
the imposition of taxes on small incomes, the book throws a great deal of light
on the desirability and feasibility of such taxation.
Roy BLovGi!
Washington, D. C.
TIlE TREASURY AND MONETARY POLICY 1933-1938. By G. Griffith Johnson,
Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. 230. $2.75.
TIis book is a discussion of the gold policy, the stabilization fund, the
sterilization policy, the silver policy and the process of formulating monetary
policy in the United States. In addition there is a considerable amount of
information set forth concerning the action taken by the Government and
particularly by the Treasury in the monetary field during the first six years
of the present administration. Such action is also subjected to extensive
analysis in terms of the aims sought to be attained and the validity and
wisdom of the methods employed to gain such ends. Dr. Johnson concludes
that
f Director of Tax Research, Treasury Department.
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"If one recreates the atmosphere and confusion of those years and
considers the inexperience with which this country was forced to
meet unprecedented monetary difficulties along with the disagree-
ments among reputable economists, .the conclusion seems a fair one
that, despite the mistakes and maladroitnesses, it is no mean achieve-
ment to have formulated and vigorously effected a monetary policy
which at least has tended in the right direction- away from the
anachronistic precepts of traditional doctrines and towards a flexible
instrumentation and non-deflationary framework more fitted to cope
with existing problems and difficulties."'
A fundamental point repeatedly discussed throughout the book is the sig-
nificant change that has occurred during the present administration in the
control over our monetary policy. The thesis is developed along the following
lines.
For many years, the commonly accepted view had been that the function of
monetary control should be exercised, if not entirely by a non-governmental
institution, at least by an agency independent of the political branches of the
Government and especially independent of the Treasury. During the 'twenties
and prior to 1933, the principal formulator of the monetary policy of the
United States was the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which was
dominated by its governor, Benjamin Strong, and many of its directors who
represented large New York banking institutions. The Federal Reserve
Board in Washington played a distinctly secondary role and the Treasury
Department an even less important role in formulating the country's fiscal
policies. Without reflecting on the integrity of the people and the institution
that dominated this country's monetary policies during this period, the author
also suggests that, in their management of monetary policy, they reflected the
attitude and prejudices of a very small particular group of society and that
such money managers were neither selected by the electorate nor accountable
to it for the determination and execution of spch policies. It was the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York that primarily determined how undesirable gold
movements should be offset or ignored in the conduct of internal policy, the
extent and character of open market operations, the rediscount rates and the
cost of money, the standards for extending Federal Reserve credit, the volume
of outstanding bank credit, whether this country should conduct its credit
policies so as to aid foreign countries to the disregard perhaps of domestic
consideration, whether it was advisable for member bank reserves to be ex-
panded or contracted and the action to be taken in implementing monetary
policy.
The author describes the series of measures that have been taken in the
monetary and banking field since March 4, 1933 which, in his judgment, have
had the effect of substituting the government for private bankers in the role
of creator and manager of fiscal policy or, as has sometimes been stated, of
removing the financial capital of the country from Wall Street to Washington,
He points out that in order to cope with the depression the government formu-
lated and executed its monetary policy, in coordination with and linked to its
programs for public works, farm aid, the RFC, the HOLC and a host of other




ment of monetary policy creates a possibility of abuse and ineffectiveness, he
suggests that this risk extends throughout the sphere of governmental activity,
that it is a risk inherent in government, and that the nation is coming to
believe that the risk of government control is no greater in the sphere of
monetary policy than in the other important spheres in which, of necessity,
government has increasingly engaged. Such government control also involves
an accountability to the electorate not available under the system of private
control.
Dr. Johnson discusses the charge that under the Roosevelt Administration
there has been an extraordinary delegation of monetary power to the Execu-
tive. He concludes that from the point of view of democratic government,
it is more desirable that the administration of the nation's monetary policies
be delegated to the President and other responsible political officials rather
than to private bankers and a privately owned and dominated bank. Further-
more, the record indicates that Congress acted together with the Executive
in the determination of the most important monetary policies of this admin-
istration, i.e., the requisitioning of gold, the elimination of gold clauses from
all obligations, the revaluation of the dollar, the establishment of the stabiliza-
tion fund, the acquisition of silver and the financing of unbalanced budgets by
borrowing. In addition, because time limitations were placed on the exercise
of certain powers delegated to the President and the Secretary of the Treasury,
Congress has periodically reviewed the action taken by the President and the
Treasury pursuant to such powers and determined the desirability of con-
tinuing such powers. It might also be observed that various people have
suggested that many monetary powers were delegated to the President to be
exercised in his discretion, in order to stem the pressure for possibly undesir-
able action on the part of certain small groups. Many of such powers have
not been exercised by the President.
Recognizing the increasing importance of the role which the Government
has had to play in the solution of the manifold profound problems confronting
the country and indicating that under such a situation it would be folly to
permit monetary management to be exercised by non-governmental agencies,
Dr. Johnson suggests the possibility of establishing a system whereby Con-
gress, through the medium of a permanent joint committee of both Houses,
could cooperate more effectively with the Executive in the management of
monetary policy.2
The author concurs in the widely held, but mistaken, view that the depre-
ciation of the dollar and the enhancement of the price of gold were intended
solely as a "means to the end of raising prices, and from this viewpoint the
gold buying policy must be largely adjudged a failure.' 2 That raising of
prices clearly was not the sole purpose of the monetary program in 1933-1934
is shown by the summary of the administration's policies and objectives with
respect to the monetary system of the United States which appears as a
note to item 16, Vol. III of the Public Papers and Addresses of President
Roosevelt.
The error of the above-quoted view is further demonstrated by the record
of what took place in the United States and in the rest of the world between
2. P.26.
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1931 and 1936. The course of events during that period makes perfectly clear
that dollar devaluation in this country just as currency depreciation in other
countries was of vital importance in breaking the downward spiral of business
and prices. When Great Britain and the sterling area depreciated their cur-
rencies beginning with September 1931, prices which had been rapidly declin-
ing in such countries ceased to fall and in some cases rose. At the same time,
prices in the United States, France and the other gold bloc countries con-
tinued to fall rapidly. When the United States dollar depreciated in value,
wholesale prices in this country rose almost thirty per cent from March 1933
to September 1934, and farm prices almost doubled. The downward move-
ment of business, prices, trade and employment stopped. The remaining gold
bloc countries continued to experience deflation until 1936 when they too
depreciated their currencies. It is true that certain groups, including some
economists, predicted a rise in all commodity prices mathematically propor-
tionate to the depreciation of the dollar. Such a price rise did not occur nor
should it have been anticipated. But the making of unwarranted claims for
the dollar devaluation and gold purchase program should not preclude the
recognition of the important role of that program in halting the deflation
and the depression. Needless to add, there were many forces contemporane-
ously at work which influenced the recovery in this country and the respective
contributions of such forces to the general recovery can not be precisely
evaluated.
Dr. Johnson recognizes the success and value of the stabilization fund and
the Tripartite Accord in maintaining orderly day to day exchanges; in pre-
venting speculative drives and political disturbances from producing technical
demoralization of the foreign exchange markets; and in offering an approach
to more permanent equilibrium and orderliness in foreign exchanges. The
author's criticism of the operation of the stabilization fund because it could
not and did not prevent the addition to the credit base of this country of the
large amounts of gold which have been imported since 1934 is not well taken.
When the Government wanted to keep incoming gold from increasing the
credit base, the Treasury sterilized the gold by not depositing with the Federal
Reserve Banks gold certificates equal to the purchase price of such gold.
Furthermore, Dr. Johnson makes no effective showing as to why our economy
would have profited if large quantities of gold imports had been continuously
sterilized. But even assuming that the economy of the nation in some respects
would have benefited by a continued sterilization of any substantial amount
of the ten billion dollars of gold which have come to this country since 1934,
the cost of such a policy, in terms of increased public debt and interest
charges thereon, as well as in terms of general increase in the cost of money,
would have been prohibitive. If at some time in the future, capital should
flow out of this country, the Government has many powers and weapons
which it would be able to employ to cushion and neutralize any shock to
our domestic economy, not the least of which is two billion dollars of free
gold in the stabilization fund.
BERNARD BERNSTEIN t
Washington, D. C.
t General Counsel's Office, Treasury, Department.
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